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Introduction 
Europe experienced a series of unprecedented terrorist attacks these past five years and has 
put the spotlight back on the classical tensions between the concept of national security, the 
state practices involving intrusive surveillance and the rule of law1. As always, the terrorist 
threat is a practical and important test for the democracy2 and the human rights3. 
Belgium is one of the most affected State by the recent wave of terrorism in Europe, as these 
attacks are the deadliest Belgium has experienced for decades. Furthermore, several 
perpetrators of the various attacks were linked to Belgium, in one way or another. Indeed, the 
country sadly holds the record for highest number of nationals joining Islamist armed groups 
per capita of any nation in Western Europe.  
Before the recent wave of attacks, Belgium had been spared the horrors associated with 
modern terrorism for an extended period4. Some terrorist acts were perpetrated, but most of 
them were carried out in the 1980’s, either by extreme left-wing terrorist groups, the Combating 
Communist Cells, or by a local criminal gang, the “Brabant killers”5. Apart from these specific 
cases and some other isolated attacks, the country remained relatively peaceful until the 
recent spark of terrorist assaults brought a number of failures and deficiencies to light. 
Following the mass-killings and bombings, Belgium was heavily criticised around the world, 
mostly based on its allegedly weak security policies 6 and its rather complex institutional 
structure, to the point Belgium-bashers dubbed the country a “failed state”7. These attacks 
have also underlined Belgium’s apparent difficulties to provide a quick response when faced 
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with obvious, current, and imminent danger.  
This paper aims to study the impact of terrorist attacks on the Belgian public law. More 
specifically, it addresses the interactions between the fight against terrorism and the concept 
of a state of emergency in Belgium. It is structured in four different sections.  
The recent wave of attacks has indeed not failed to spark a debate in Europe regarding the 
establishment of a so-called state of emergency. But Belgian constitutional law does not 
explicitly enshrine a specific provision concerning a state of emergency. While Article 167 of 
the Belgian Constitution does indeed mention the existence of a "state of war", there is no 
temporary regime which could be described as a state of emergency and which would allow 
a restriction of fundamental rights in peace time (Section 1). In other words, security 
management must be deployed in accordance with the usual constitutional and legal 
requirements. 
The events of the last five years have profoundly changed the paradigm (Section 2) by placing 
the Belgian State at the forefront of the fight against (and the prevention) of terrorism. Faced 
with an emergency situation, but in the absence of a sui generis legal framework, the public 
authorities demonstrated pragmatism in managing the risk of armed actions, relying in part on 
the goodwill of the various actors who sometimes came under different levels of power in the 
Belgian federal structure. 
The federal authorities in charge of the fight against terrorism finally acted in two ways. On the 
one hand, in order to stem the problem immediately, they used the legal means at their 
disposal, which already allow a rapid and effective response to the phenomenon (Section 3). 
At the same time, the ordinary legal environment was disrupted. Then, and in a fairly short 
period of time, a series of (more or less) ad hoc laws and regulations were adopted in order 
to further adapt the Belgian legislation to the particularities and importance of the 
contemporary terrorist threat (Section 4).  
Section 1 – A notable constitutional absence 
What should be understood by “state of emergency” or “state of exception”, is a situation in 
which a state, while confronted to a severe, imminent and deadly threat, directed towards the 
state itself and its people, responds by taking actions that would never be acceptable under 
normal circumstances, given the working principles of that state8. The state of exception is 
activated – generally by the government – when the state is facing a challenge so intense and 
so exceptional that it leads the state to derogate from its own constitutional principles, among 
which civil liberties and institutional rules, for the sake of self-preservation9 . The need to 
declare a state of emergency may arise from situations as diverse as an armed action against 
the state by internal or external elements, a natural disaster, civil unrest, an epidemic, a 
financial or economic crisis. It is during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the 
European constitutions began to introduce the concept of state of emergency. 
It could seem paradoxical to suspend the enjoyment of fundamental rights and key principles 
of a State10 in order to protect it. The State, however, has the responsibility and duty to 
safeguard its independence, its territorial integrity, its continuity and to preserve the 
constitution. Whereas emergency management tends to focus on collective needs11, States 
are granted, in limited time, space, and scope, wider powers to restore a state of a normalcy 
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under which its citizens can fully exercise their freedoms in a democratic system considered 
“as a system that lays down absolute limits for the unfailing observance of certain essential 
human rights”12.  
As the terrorist threat within Europe increases, as showed by the number of recent terrorist 
attacks, the debate regarding the possibility to implement such a state of emergency has been 
re-opened in several EU countries. 
The day after the coordinated terrorist attack across Paris on the 13 November 2015, the 
French president François Hollande declared the first national state of emergency in France 
since 1961 and, via three decrees, activated Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955, which defines 
the contents of the emergency measures13. 
In Belgium, such system does not exist14. 
Article 187 of the Constitution – previous article 130 – provides that “[t]he Constitution cannot 
be wholly or partially suspended”. So, it forbids in plain and intelligible language all emergency 
situations. For historical and philosophical reasons, the constituent feared that such 
mechanism would have left open the possibility of abuse15. 
This article was not included in the first draft of the Constitutional Commission. During the 
Congress debate of 5 February 1831, a member of Congress, Van Snick, proposed a 
constitutional clause inspired by the French author Benjamin Constant16: “The constitutional 
powers only exist by virtue of the Constitution. They cannot, in whichever case or under 
whichever pretexted, suspend its action”. To support this amendment, Van Snick referred to 
the French political instability where every regime violated and suspended the constitutions of 
its predecessors: 
“Vous le savez, messieurs, tous les pouvoirs qui se sont succédés en France ont tour à 
tour violé et suspendu les constitutions qui devaient régir immuablement ce pays, et ce, 
en invoquant chaque fois la grande loi : Salus populi suprema lex esto. Comme si le 
salut du peuple n’était pas toujours attaché à l’inflexible exécution des lois, et surtout de 
la loi fondamentale”17. 
Constant was still fresh in the constituent mind. In his comments on the Belgian Constitution, 
a former member of Congress, Thonissen considered the article 187 (130 at the moment) as 
a guarantee against the floodgates to despotism: 
“Les ministres téméraires qui se permettent de violer la Constitution déguisent 
ordinairement leurs projets sous l’apparence du désir de sauver les institutions 
nationales, menaces, disent-ils, par la violence des passions politique. ‘Ils s’écrient, dit 
Benjamin Constant, qu’une Constitution est une citadelle, et que, lorsqu’une citadelle 
est bloquée, la garnison peut en sortir pour disperser les assiégeants qui la bloquent’. 
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16 E. VAN HOOYDONCK, “Het Artikel 130 van de Grondwet als algemene grondslag van het bestendigheidsbeginsel 
in het administratief recht”, Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht, 1992, 81. 
17 E. HUYTTENS, Discussions du Congrès National de Belgique 1830-1831, vol. 2, Brussels, Société typographique 
Belge, 464. 
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Mais l’histoire de la France moderne répond victorieusement à ces sophismes ; elle 
nous a fait connaître les effets inévitables de cette étrange politique constitutionnelle qui 
conduit en droite ligne au despotisme. Ce n’est pas en anéantissant les formes tutélaires 
de la liberté et de l’ordre que les gouvernements peuvent espérer de se maintenir; ils 
sont déjà perdus lorsqu’il ne leur reste d’autres ressources que les mesures illégales et 
vexatoires”18. 
A discussion took place over its formulation19, but proposal was eventually approved. Article 
187 became one of the few explicit cross-section clauses of the Belgian Constitution20. But 
this excessively optimistic21 “peace-time” constitution22 did not survive the passage of time23. 
On 8 August 1831, facing the invasion of Belgium by the Dutch army, King Leopold the 1st 
asked the help of the French army without the parliament’s consent even though article 185 
(former article 121) of the Constitution forbade it24. 
It is mainly during the two World Wars that the constitutional rules had to conform to the state 
of necessity. First, the “arrêtés-lois” (legal executive orders or Decree-law) were adopted in 
time of war25 and given the same legislative status as law, despite the fact they were enacted 
without the assistance of the Parliamentary Assembly, which couldn’t be gathered26. These 
Decree-law were adopted by: 
- King Albert the 1st and the de Broqueville Cabinet (during the First World War); 
- King Léopold the 3rd and the Pierlot Cabinet (at the beginning of the Second World War); 
- the Ministers meeting within the Council during the King Leopold the 3rd’s impossibility of 
reigning (during the Second World War). 
In its judgements Geubelle of 11 February 191927, and Leemans of 11 December 194428, the 
Court of Cassation recognized the legislative nature of these acts. We can read in the Court’s 
opinions that the King, as the third branch of the legislative power, had taken the necessary 
legal measures required to defend the territorial and the vital interests of the Belgian Nation. 
Secondly, the Decree-Law of 11 October 191629 on the state of war and the state of siege 
restricts essential rights, as it allows prior censorship, violation of the principle of confidentiality 
of correspondence, and so on. Furthermore, the Decree-Law of 12 October 191830 empowers 
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21 A. PASTOR Y CAMARASA, “Constitution et lutte antiterroriste : le cas belge”, Annuaire international de Justice 
constitutionnelle, Vol. XXXII, 31; See also F. DELPÉRÉE and M. VERDUSSEN, « Table ronde - Lutte contre le terrorisme 
et protection des droits fondamentaux : Belgique », Annuaire international de Justice constitutionnelle, vol. XVIII, 
91-110. 
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belge», Belgique judiciaire, 1935, 394. 
23 R. ERGEC, “L’état de nécessité en droit constitutionnel belge”, Le nouveau droit constitutionnel, Brussels, 
Bruylant, 1987, 145.  
24 Y. LEJEUNE, “Article 185”, in M. VERDUSSEN (dir.), La Constitution belge - Lignes & entrelignes, Brussels, Le Cri, 
2004, 422. 
25 See C. BEHRENDT, « Excursion à l’orée de la chasse gardée du juge constitutionnel – La Cour constitutionnelle 
et le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des arrêtés-lois de temps de guerre, des arrêtés-lois de pouvoirs 
extraordinaires et des décrets du Congrès national », Revue de Droit de l’ULg, 2007, 537-542. 
26 Voy. J. DE MEYER, « Over de legitimiteit van de besluitwetten van de oorlogsregeringen in 1914-1918 en in 1940-
1944”, in Liber Amicorum August De Schryver, minister van Staat, Gent, 1968, 296-304. 
27 Pasicrisie 1919, I, 9. 
28 Pasicrisie 1945, I, 65. 
29 Belgian Monitor (further in the paper, see B.M.), 15 October 1916. 
30 B.M., 13 October 1918. 
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the Minister of Justice to intern persons suspected of relations with the enemy31. 
These Decrees-Law gave rise to a lively and stormy debate about its compatibility with Article 
187. Some argued that article 187 only covered the hypothesis of a voluntary suspension of 
the Constitution32, not the case of force majeure33 or external aggressions34. According to the 
case law and the “legisprudence” of the Belgian Council of State, a distinction should be made, 
in the context of war, between unconstitutional acts and extra-constitutional acts35 . Other 
authors have declared that the measures could be justified by the state of necessity 36 . 
Moreover, the Court of Cassation referred to evidence that the constituent’s intent was to grant 
a security right and to ensure the continuity of the State 37 . This view was confirmed 
afterwards38. 
The situation is however radically different when the public institutions are not unable to work 
because the country is occupied by a foreign army. There is no case-law to support the plea 
that the Constitution could be suspended in the hypothesis of either insecurity or terrorist 
threat39. However, during the 60’s, proposals were made to establish a state of emergency in 
case of internal crisis: 
“At first sight, a not-expressly-provided-by-the-Constitution state of exception may seem 
unconstitutional. The exercise of powers granted by the Constitution is an obligation for 
the authorities it designates. These powers cannot, in principle, be exercised in any other 
way than that provided for in the Constitution; but that is to give too much importance to 
the formal aspect of things and to sacrifice the spirit of the Constitution. Above all, it 
wants to safeguard the survival and permanence of the State, the supreme guarantee 
of the common good and safeguarding the general interest”40.  
The aforementioned proposal ignores one of the fundamental rules of the Constitution and 
can be criticized on many counts, especially since the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court41 . Under our constitutional system, in all circumstances, including the fight against 
terrorism, the public institutions must keep functioning normally and the exercise of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms can only be limited within the constraints of common 
law42 . In our mind, a real emergency state could only be implemented by following the 
constitutional amendment procedure provided by Article 195 of the Constitution, which is 
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constitutionnelles”, Bulletin de la Classe des lettres et des sciences politiques et sociales, 1941, 217-218. 
33 O. ORBAN, Droit constitutionnel de la Belgique, vol. I, Liège/Paris, H. Dessain/Giard & Brière, 1906, 334-335. 
34 R. ERGEC and S. WATHÉE, “Les dérogations aux droits constitutionnels”, in M. VERDUSSEN and N. BONBLED, Les 
droits constitutionnels en Belgique : les enseignements jurisprudentiels de la Cour Constitutionnelle, du Conseil 
d’État et de la Cour de cassation, I, Brussels, Bruylant, 2011, 405-406. 
35 Cass., 4 March 1940, Pasicrisie, 1946, I, 493 and the conclusion of the Attorney General R. Hayoit de Termicourt. 
36 See F. DUMON, “Over enkele grondwettelijke problemen gerezen tijdens de tweede wereldoorlog”, Academia 
Analecta, 1983, 47. 
37 Cass., February 11, 1919, Pasicrisie, 1919, I, 9. 
38 Cass., 10 January 1950, Pasicrisie, 1950, I, 304; Cass., 8 January 1952, Pasicrisie, 1952, I, 244. 
39 N. BONBLED, “Les aspects contemporains de la continuité de l’État : l’exception, l’urgence et la transition”, Journal 
des Tribunaux, 2014, 643. 
40 “Proposition de loi portant l’installation d’un état d’urgence”, Doc. parl., Senate, 31 January 1962, 105. 
41 See S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, “L’article 187 de la Constitution”, Revue belge de Droit constitutionnel, 2006, 
293-297; contra: R. ERGEC and S. WATHÉE, “Les dérogations aux droits constitutionnels”, in M. VERDUSSEN and N. 
BONBLED, Les droits constitutionnels en Belgique : les enseignements jurisprudentiels de la Cour Constitutionnelle, 
du Conseil d’État et de la Cour de cassation, I, Brussels, Bruylant, 2011, 406. 
42 F. DELPÉRÉE and M. VERDUSSEN, « Table ronde - Lutte contre le terrorisme et protection des droits fondamentaux : 
Belgique », Annuaire international de Justice constitutionnelle, vol. XVIII, 96. 
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particularly cumbersome43. Moreover, Article 187 is currently not declared to be revisable44. 
For lack of better tools, however, the parliament may, in accordance with Article 105, have 
recourse to the special powers laws45, delegate specific and wide powers to the executive46, 
including the ability to amend the law with the a posteriori concurrence of the Parliament. That 
being said, on the one side, this special powers mechanism was never used in the matter of 
security breach and cannot be confused with a state of emergency. On the other side, when 
used, it doesn’t relieve the executive power from its obligation to respect the fundamental 
rights. 
It will be noted from the foregoing paragraphs that the national Constitution is more protective 
than international conventions47 which provide, in a controlled manner, derogation provision, 
especially Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The two articles are quite similar, as they allow 
States Parties to “take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”48. Both conventions provide a 
list of non-derogable rights, from which it can never be necessary to derogate even in cases 
of emergency situations. 
Significant and thoughtful constitutional reform proposals have been made on the basis of 
these international conventions over the past ten years, especially given the new threat posed 
by terrorist groups49. 
Section 2 – A fundamental change of paradigm – A clear and present terrorist danger 
One of the most significant issues that has an impact on the coexistence and security of the 
citizens of Europe and Belgium is the threat of international terrorism. Shortly after the 9/11 
attacks, fingers were pointed at the lack of state of emergency in our constitutional law. After 
the Paris attacks, almost fifteen years later, this issue has been taken over by the politics, who 
wish to take the current emergency measures a step further. Such measures must indeed 
nevertheless be taken in accordance with both the fundamental freedoms of the Kingdom50 
and the federal structure of the country. 
A) 2006 – A concrete proposal 
On the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to terrorism51, 
legal experts who participated in a parliamentary working group specialising in fundamental 
rights suggested in 2006 the inclusion of a derogatory clause52. Such a provision would have 
allowed the adoption of exceptional measures within a clearly defined constitutional 
                                                      
43 Firstly, Parliament must adopt a list of constitutional provisions which are declared to be revisable. Then the 
Parliament is dissolved. After the elections, the freshly composed Parliament has the power to modify the 
constitutional provisions which were declared open to revision, and only them. For this last step, two thirds of the 
members of each Chamber of Parliament ought to be present and two thirds of the present members must approve 
the amendment. 
44 Declaration of revision of the Constitution of 25 April 2014, B.M., 28 April 2014. 
45 Y. LEJEUNE, Droit constitutionnel belge : fondements et institutions, 2nd edition, Brussels, Larcier, 2014, § 58. 
46 Opinion of the Council of State, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 95-96, 7 June 1996, No 609/1. 
47 N. BONBLED et C. ROMAINVILLE, “États d’exceptions et crises humaines ambigües : débat recent autour du 
terrorisme et des nouvelles forms de crise”, Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 2008, 429-459. 
48 ECHR, Grand Chamber, A. e.a v. the United Kingdom case of 19 February 2009. 
49 S. SOTTIAUX, Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights: The ECHR and the US Constitution, Oxford and Portland, 
Hart Publishing, 2008, 30. 
50 G. DE BRAECKELEER, L. MYS, K. VAN AELST, P. VANDE VELDE-VAN RUMST, J. GOOSSENS, and S. DEVRIENDT, “Nood 
aan noodtoestand in België?”, Belgian Constitutional Law Blog, 21 February, 2017, 
51 ECHR, May 26th, 1993, Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom case. 
52  Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2004-2005, 20 February 2006, No 2304/001. See E. BREMS, “Vers des clauses 
transversales en matière de libertés dans la Constitution belge?”, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits Homme, 2007, 
367-368. 
 7 
frameworks, which preserve the strengthening of the principles of the rule of law53 . This 
recommendation has not been acted upon. 
B) The State of emergency back on the table 
Even if the federal government proudly announced that the implementation of a state of 
emergency was not on the agenda54, there were serious discussions about the opportunity to 
implement state of emergency powers55 , mainly after the Paris attacks 56 . The “most far- 
reaching safety measures” 57  was the safety plans of the Flemish political party N-VA, 
presented in September 2016, as “Niveau V. Verandering voor veiligheid”. This security plan 
provides a state of emergency declared by the National Security Council. This situation would 
allow preventive detentions and the establishment of separate courts dealing with terrorism 
cases. National Security Council and municipalities would be able to deploy troops, to forbid 
public meetings, to control internal borders, to give house arrest, to filter social media and put 
websites offline. This state of emergency would be endorsed by the Parliament within five 
days and be valid for three months. 
According to the N-VA, this plan still remains within the limits of the Constitution, according to 
the Supreme Court’s case law on state of war. Referring to Attorney general Hayoit de 
Termicourt’s reasoning58 , the Flemish nationalists argued that the necessity to safeguard 
national sovereignty and the continuity of government power have supra-constitutional value, 
allowing for extra-constitutional measures when State’s institutions or the country’s existence 
as a civil community are imperilled. 
However, a lot of scholars pointed out the legal weakness of such reasoning, regarding article 
18759 and article 14660 of the Constitution. 
C) A pragmatic response to major emergencies 
From 21 November to 25 November 2015, the federal government of Belgium imposed a 
security lockdown on Brussels due to information about potential terrorist attacks in the wake 
of the series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris by the Islamic State. During this period, 
the threat level was increased by the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) to 4 
(on a scale of four) for the Brussels region. As we will explain later, CUTA has been, since 
2006, the official Belgian public authority that coordinates the police and intelligence services 
and that assesses whether Belgium is a target of terrorist and extremist threats.  
Following a National Security Council to which the Communities (federated entities) chiefs of 
governments were invited, the Prime Minister took some measures and recommended others. 
                                                      
53 Venice Commission, “Les pouvoirs d’exception”, Strasbourg, Sciences et technique de la démocratie, no 12, 
CDL-STD(1995)02; see also J. FEREJOHN and P. PASQUINO, “Law of exception: A typology of emergency powers”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2004, 158-173 and D. MCGOLDRICK, “The Interface of public emergency 
power and international law”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2004, 380. 
54 See V. SOUTY, “Les dérogations en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles : un régime en demi-teinte”. Revue 
trimestrielle D.H., 2017, 90. On 22 March 2016, the Minister of the Interior stated to RTBF that he dit not want to 
think about the special powers Acts: “Ce n’est pas dans la culture de notre démocratie. Je ne sais pas ce que ça 
rapporte. On a pris beaucoup de mesures […]. Je pense qu’on doit rester cool, vraiment maîtriser la situation et 
voir si on doit ajouter des mesures”. 
55 L. VANOOST, “Noodtoestand in Frankrijk, kan het in België ook?”, DeWereldMorgen.be, 17 November 2015. 
56 M. BUXANT, “Le gouvernement étudie la possibilité d'un couvre-feu en cas d'état d'urgence”, L'Echo, 21 January 
2016, 4. 
57 P. POPELIER and W. VANDENBRUWAENE, “Niveau V. Verandering voor veiligheid (Level V. Change for safety)”, 
Osservatorio sulle fonti, January 2017 (https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/rubriche/sources-of-law-in-the-
european-union-member-states/belgium). 
58 Pasicrisie, 1946, 493. 
59 P. POPELIER and W. VANDENBRUWAENE, “Niveau V. Verandering voor veiligheid (Level V. Change for safety)”, 
Osservatorio sulle fonti, January 2017 (https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/rubriche/sources-of-law-in-the-
european-union-member-states/belgium). 
60 “No extraordinary courts or commissions may be created, no matter under which designation”. 
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The Brussels subway, the public transport, the schools, the universities, restaurants were 
closed and some events, such as football games, were cancelled. The communes and 
provinces were invited to cancel events on their territories. The communication was rather 
confused and, as the journalist Bertrand Henne said:  
“In a few days, Belgium and especially Brussels’ reputation has been tainted as ever. In 
a nutshell, the federal government has not been up to the task, and the regions and 
communities stayed in the background”61. 
It must be acknowledged that the institutional structure of Belgium does not help the 
centralisation of capacity decisions. Belgium is a federal State composed of two kinds of 
federated entities: the Regions and the Communities. The Federal authority, the Communities 
and the Regions are on an equal footing but have powers and responsibilities for different 
fields. At a lower level, the provinces are supervised by every higher government authorities, 
in the context of the federal, community or regional powers. At the bottom of the pyramid, we 
find the communes (or municipalities). 
Among other things, the federal government is responsible for security and home affairs and 
for justice. It is hard to get a centrally controlled decision-making because of that fragmented 
authority. Moreover, the Brussels region is composed of 19 municipalities, each with their own 
mayor and institutions. At the same time, these 19 municipalities are covered by six different 
police zones. In sum, the federal structure of the country and the multitude of decision-making 
layers easily leads to paralysis. That is also the case in fighting terrorism. “Een samenhangend 
antiterreurbeleid gaat in tegen de federale logica van België”, said Marc Hooghe, professor at 
the KUL62. 
Inevitably, this has prompted the question of whether public authorities could react in case of  
direct terrorist threat.  
Section 3 – A reaction by an ordinary legislative arsenal 
Despite the absence of an institutionalised state of emergency – or state of exception – in 
Belgium, the Belgian government had to face a scourge of an inconsiderate scale. From 24 
May 2014, the date of the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium was brought, 
via an ordinary legislative arsenal, to adapt to the new terrorist threat. A series of measures 
have been taken, sometimes in haste, sometimes in the medium or long term. 
In a brief retrospective of the resources deployed over the last five years, the aim of this section 
will be to assess the impact, in practice, of the absence of a state of emergency in Belgium. 
Of course, it is not for us to evaluate the relevance of the action of the government of the 
Kingdom during these difficult moments but to examine the general structure of action in the 
field of the fight against terrorism. 
First of all, it is important to say that, following the attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016, a 
parliamentary inquiry committee was set up to clarify the way in which these tragic events took 
place and were dealt with, as well as to reveal any political responsibilities. This committee, 
which has worked for several months, benefited from a significant asset, namely the access 
to a series of confidential documents63. For this particular reason, we shall take the liberty of 
                                                      
61 B. HENNE, “Les Coulisses des Pouvoirs - 13 Novembre : la Belgique à la limite”, Rtbf, 14 November 2016. 
62 C. CILLEKENS, “De tragiek van Belgistan”, De Limburger, 3 April 2016. 
63 Indeed, according to art. 4 of the statutes of the inquiry committee, the latter “may hear any person whom it 
deems necessary to bring before it and may have at its disposal all the documents it deems necessary for the 
performance of its duties”. Furthermore, it “may at any time decide to meet in closed session” (art. 7). See Proposal 
to set up a parliamentary inquiry committee to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 
March 2016 at Brussels National Airport and the Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the 
development and management of the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2015-
2016, 11 April 2016, No. 54 1752/001, 11-12. 
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referring to the committee’s intermediate reports. 
The Belgian legal system does not lack the legal means to deal with an emergency situation 
such as it has been known to face in terrorist matters. The Royal Regulation of 16 February 
2006 defines the emergency situation (Article 6, § 2) as follows: 
“any event which causes or is likely to cause harmful consequences for social life, such 
as a serious disorder of public security, a serious threat to the life or health of 
individuals and/or to important material interests, and which requires the coordination 
of disciplines in order to eliminate the threat or limit the harmful consequences”64. 
As a result of this emergency situation, several reactions have been put in place following the 
attacks of recent years, especially in Paris and Brussels. We will discuss successively the 
emergency plans (A.), the role of the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) (B.) and 
the Operation Vigilant Guardian (C.). As regards to the Brussels lockdown, having already 
dealt with it previously, please refer to our dedicated commentary.  
A) Emergency plans 
During that day on March 22, one was first able to count on the existence of emergency 
planning. Emergency planning in Belgium consists of three types of plans: multidisciplinary 
emergency and response plans, developed by local authorities, monodisciplinary response 
plans, which local authorities check against certain criteria, and internal emergency plans of 
companies and institutions at risk, that local authorities take into account in developing their 
own emergency planning. 
The whole has four phases65. Phases 1 and 2 are coordinated at the municipal (local) level, 
while phase 3 involves coordination by the governor at the provincial level. Phase 4, used 
during the terrorist attacks, is coordinated by the Minister of the Interior at the federal level66. 
The national alert or “phase 4 alert” is triggered by the Minister of the Interior and may be 
preceded by an early warning phase (Crisis Centre)67. 
In addition to these emergency plans, there may be other emergency and contingency plans, 
specific to particular areas, which are in principle confidential. Thus, in the documents given 
as a confidential document to the members of the parliamentary inquiry committee relating to 
the attacks in Brussels were the emergency plan for Zaventem airport as well as the 
emergency plan of the STIB (Brussels public transport company). 
The committee’s intermediate report recounts the first moments following the attack in 
Brussels: 
“On March 22, 2016, the federal phase took time to begin. Very quickly (after a few 
minutes), it had already become clear on the ground that the explosions in Zaventem 
were the work of terrorists. 
Very quickly a series of measures were taken from the Crisis Centre. At 08:45, the 
CUTA announces the passage to threat level 4 for the whole territory, with particular 
                                                      
64 Royal Regulation of 16 February 2006 on emergency and intervention plans, B.M., 15 March 2006. 
65 Royal Regulation of 31 January 2003 establishing the emergency plan for events and crisis situations requiring 
coordination or management at national level, B.M., 21 February 2003. 
66 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Intermediate and provisional report on the ‘assistance and 
relief’ aspect, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/006, 27. 
67 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Intermediate and provisional report on the ‘assistance and 
relief’ aspect, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/006, 27. 
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attention for international stations, regional airports, all means of public transport, 
nuclear power stations and the port of Antwerp. Notification to all intended recipients 
is made by fax at 09:04. 
Following this evaluation, a number of specific actions were taken at the coordination 
meeting that started in the meantime. 
The federal crisis management phase was only triggered at 09:03, and the 
‘coordination meeting’ became a ‘crisis unit’ in accordance with the Royal Regulation 
of 31 January 2003. This decision was not clear on the ground and some witnesses 
stated that they were aware of the activation of this federal phase before that time. In 
the meantime, several meetings of the National Security Council have been held with 
the aim of taking general measures within the framework of threat level 4”68. 
Despite this apparent preparation, the analysis of the inquiry committee is not very optimistic: 
“distressing observation on information management: lack of overall vision and strategy; 
increased information overload; abundance of data banks; insufficient analytical capacity; 
compartmentalization and, consequently, insufficient sharing; inefficient and outdated 
processing processes”. It also stresses that “the fragmentation of information is aggravated 
by two dividing lines: between the judicial and administrative aspects; between the federal 
police and the local police”. We will come back to this last point69. 
B) The role and functioning of the CUTA 
The Coordination Body for Threat Analysis, CUTA, is a body established by the Law of 10 July 
2006 and is responsible for threat assessment70. After a little less than ten years of relatively 
peaceful existence, the CUTA has become, during the wave of attacks perpetrated on Belgian 
soil, an essential institution. At the time its existence was revealed to the broad public, a host 
of questions were asked about its legitimacy and way of functioning. It is therefore up to us 
first draft a brief portrait of this body. 
The CUTA succeeded the Inter-Agency Group against Terrorism (GIA) and is placed under 
the joint authority of the Ministers of Justice and the Interior (Article 5 of the Law). In addition 
to its directors, it is composed of experts and specialized analysts (art. 7). Its tasks are to carry 
out periodically a joint strategic assessment to evaluate whether threats may arise or how they 
are evolving, to carry out a joint assessment on an ad hoc basis and to ensure specific 
international relations with foreign or international counterparts (art. 8). The CUTA is also the 
receptacle of a whole series of intelligence and police information, enabling it to carry out its 
missions successfully.  
The CUTA is not exempt from parliamentary oversight since it is subject to the oversight of 
both the Standing Committee on the Oversight of Police Services (P Committee) and the 
Standing Committee on the Oversight of Intelligence and Security Services (R Committee). 
The Circular FTF of 21 August 2015 sets out the responsibilities and tasks of the CUTA, which 
is also responsible for the exchange of information on hate preachers71. 
Its most important prerogative is certainly to assess the threat and determine its level. 
                                                      
68 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Intermediate and provisional report on the ‘assistance and 
relief’ aspect, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/006, 37. 
69 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Third interim report, on the ‘security architecture’ aspect, Doc. 
parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/008, 55. 
70 Act of 10 July 2006 on threat analysis, B.M., 20 July 2006. 
71 Circular of 18 July 2016 on the exchange of information and follow-up of hate preachers. 
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According to Article 11 § 6 of the Royal Regulation on the CUTA72, there are four levels of 
threat: level 1 or low; level 2 or medium; level 3 or serious and level 4 or very serious. Threat 
assessments are intended for different political, administrative or judicial authorities with any 
security responsibilities. It is important to recall, at this stage, that these very authorities must 
ultimately take appropriate measures to counter a possible threat as soon as it is detected. 
On 22 March 2016, the CUTA, as one can foresee, stated that it had assessed the threat level 
at 4, very serious. Almost automatically, the government seized the information and declared 
the lockdown on the city of Brussels. Thereafter, the CUTA’s statements was examined in an 
unprecedented way. 
At this stage, it is important to make an observation on the functioning of the CUTA, which 
marks a first illustration of the “administrativisation” of the treatment of the terrorist threat, on 
which we will look further below. Indeed, this semi-independent body of experts has taken on 
considerable importance in the fight against terrorism and more particularly in legitimizing 
political decisions. There is, in fact, a kind of transfer of responsibility for the decision on 
exceptional measures taken during or after the attacks, of which this direct quote from the 
inquiry committee’s report on the 22 March 2016 attacks is a perfect illustration: 
“Some confusion and dissatisfaction was sometimes expressed about maintaining 
level 3 while some occupational categories (e.g. police) had already moved to level 2. 
These reactions illustrate that subjectivity and self-interest are still often dominant in 
the services concerned, which sometimes have difficulty accepting CUTA decisions”73. 
Thus, the use of the terms “accepting CUTA decisions” induces the idea of automaticity 
between the CUTA’s opinion on a possible level of threat and the government’s decision to 
take it into account and act accordingly. This is all the more striking as the CUTA does not 
carry out a risk analysis but only a threat analysis. In the same way, the Minister of the Interior 
himself has, on the occasion of a Flemish television programme, said that the CUTA 
determines the level of threat and that the government “prend acte” of it74, which basically 
means that he does not have a say about it. 
In reality, it is the CGCCR that evaluates the effects related to the level of threat set by the 
CUTA. If necessary, the NSC provides for additional measures 75 . The CGCCR (Strategic 
Intelligence and Security Committee) submits proposals to the NSC (National Security 
Committee), which has sole decision-making authority. This is logical, because the latter is a 
purely governmental body since it is chaired by the Prime Minister and is composed of the 
Deputy Prime Ministers and the Ministers of Justice, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Interior. 
While this is only of de facto importance, the CUTA is also taking on a new importance, since 
its reasoned opinion has become a formal obligation on the faculty to refuse to issue an identity 
card, provided for in the new Article 6 of the Law of 19 July 1991 on population registers76. We 
                                                      
72 Royal Regulation of 28 November 2006 implementing the Law of 10 July 2006 on threat analysis, B.M., 1st 
December 2006. 
73 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Third interim report, on the ‘security architecture’ aspect, Doc. 
parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/008, 44. 
74 See. the reference to it in the course of a parliamentary question, Doc., Question No. 199 by Raoul HEDEBOUW, 
MP, 13 February 2015 (DO 2014201501718), sess. 2014-2015, No. QRVA 54 017, 19. 
75 Parliamentary inquiry to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels 
National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the development and management of 
the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat - Third interim report, on the ‘security architecture’ aspect, Doc. 
parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 3 August 2016, No. 54 1752/008, 153. 
76 Law of 9 November 2015 on various provisions of the Interior, B.M., 30 November 2015. See also M.-A. 
BEERNAERT, « Renforcement de l’arsenal législatif anti-terroriste : entre symboles et prévention », Journal des 
Tribunaux, 2015/40, 835 and V. LAFARQUE, « Terrorisme : impact sur la délivrance des cartes d’identité », Bulletin 
social & juridique, 2015/549, 16. 
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will come back to that. 
C) Operation Vigilant Guardian 
Following the attacks on Charlie Hebdo’s editorial staff in Paris in early 2015, the Belgian 
government was able to set up a major operation, which was already legally possible for 
several decades. It is the presence of soldiers on the streets. 
On 17 January 2015, a Memorandum of Understanding was approved by the Council of 
Ministers and concluded between the Interior and Defence Ministers77. It sets up ‘Operation 
Vigilant Guardian’, a gigantic operation of occupation of the public space by the army, never 
seen before in Belgium in peacetime for decades. Two types of missions are possible for the 
military: patrols or fixed posts. Street patrols provide protection for all users of public space. 
As for fixed posts such as buildings, they are considered as sensitive places. In this case, the 
aim is to provide protection for people working in these places. These measures are further 
reinforced in Brussels, where the terrorist threat is higher than in the rest of the country. The 
number of military personnel mobilized has increased through the years until now. There were 
1.800 soldiers on the streets in the wake of the 22 March attacks78. 
Legally, everything already existed to rapidly deploy such an operation. A Law as well as a 
Royal Regulation of 1994 mark out these missions79. Thus, the military, whether on the basis 
of a memorandum of understanding or a requisition 80  – i.e. without having to seek 
parliamentary approval –, may be assigned to a police support mission, provided that the 
police services’ resources are not sufficient to maintain public order81. Under article 7/5 of the 
Law on the Police Function, however, the direction of operations remains the exclusive 
prerogative of a police officer82.  
Section 4 – A new criminal framework 
The terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 
prompted Belgian authorities to announce two sets of measures to fight terrorism. The first is 
a package of 12 counterterrorism measures, released in January 2015. The second set of 18 
measures was announced in the days following the Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 
201583. From the very first pages of its report, the parliamentary inquiry committee wrote that 
“Belgium, like other countries, has shown a willingness to strengthen the legislative arsenal 
available to the services in the fight against terrorism”84. Here we leave immediate action, 
facing an emergency situation as described above, to focus on delayed action. The main 
                                                      
77 It should be noted that this Memorandum of Understanding remains, for obvious reasons, classified. At most, 
we can capture bits of it by indirect means. The authors of this article have therefore not been able to become 
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78 Motion for a resolution to disengage the Defence from Operation Vigilant Guardian in favour of a specific police 
force, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2016-2017, 16 November 2016, No 54 2156/001, 4. 
79 Law of 20 May 1994 on the periods and positions of military personnel in the reserve framework and on the 
implementation and conditioning of the Armed Forces, B.M., 21 June 1994 ; Royal Regulation determining the 
forms of operational engagement and preparatory activities for the implementation of the Armed Forces, B.M., 20 
July 1994. 
80 Article 6/2 of the Royal Regulation of 6 July 1994 determining the forms of operational engagement and 
preparatory activities for the implementation of the armed forces, B.M., 20 July 1994. 
81 Article 43 of the Law of 7 December 1998 organising an integrated police service, structured at two levels, B.M., 
5 January 1999. 
82 N. LAGASSE, « L’emploi de la force sur le territoire national par les militaires en dehors des situations régies par 
le droit des conflits armés », Revue belge de Droit constitutionnel, 2013, 35. 
83 S. ANDRÉ and V. SERON, “30 measures against terrorism: penal populism between expected efficiency and 
potential collateral damage”, in T. RENARD (ed.) Counterterrorism in Belgium: key challenges and policy options, 
Egmont Paper 89, Brussels, Egmont, January 2016, 10-22. 
84 Proposal to set up a parliamentary inquiry committee to examine the circumstances leading to the terrorist 
attacks of 22 March 2016 at Brussels National Airport and Maelbeek underground station in Brussels, including the 
evolution and management of the fight against radicalism and the terrorist threat, Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2015-2016, 
11 April 2016, No. 54 1752/001, 5. 
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difference is the intervention, to this end, of the legislator alongside the executive branch. 
There are two ways of dealing with the terrorist phenomenon through legislative action. On 
the one hand, it involves adopting new laws or amending existing laws in order to create a 
special regime for terrorist offences and persons suspected of terrorism or dangerous 
radicalisation (A.). This first aspect is marked by the pre-eminence of the judiciary in the 
treatment and evaluation of these situations deemed dangerous. On the other hand, it raises 
a question of regulating the public space, most of the time through Royal Regulations (B). The 
actors put forward are no longer the judges but the administration and the police, who act by 
the notion of public order. We can see in it a movement of administrativisation of the terrorist 
and jihadist phenomenon.  
A) Legislative amendments in criminal matters/power to the judge 
Several ordinary legislative changes have taken place since the first attack on the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels in 201485. Among these, several will be of interest to us, namely the Law 
of 20 July 2015 to strengthen the fight against terrorism 86 ; the Law of 27 April 2016 on 
complementary measures to combat terrorism (1)87 , the Law of 2 August 2016 containing 
various provisions on combating terrorism (III) (1)88; the Law of 14 December 2016 amending 
the Criminal Code as regards the suppression of terrorism (1)89; and the Law of 17 May 2017 
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view to promoting the fight against terrorism 
(1)90. 
Of course, most of these laws are more or less an extension of existing terrorism legislation. 
Thus, the inclusion in ordinary legislation of a new offence relating to travel abroad for terrorist 
purposes in article 140sexies of the Criminal Code by the Law of 20 July 2015 should first be 
highlighted. As the doctrine emphasizes, “this will certainly raise important evidentiary 
problems, especially since the conduct will be punishable ‘regardless of whether or not the 
terrorist offence is committed”91. Indeed, it is no longer the commission itself that is punishable, 
but the intention of the alleged jihadist. While the punishment of intent already exists to some 
extent in the Criminal Code, it is taken to its extreme here in that it presupposes a particularly 
thorough faculty of investigation. Consequently, the “ambiguous dimension” of this new 
legislation is bound to arise92. 
Secondly, and not least, the legislator has extended the possibility of using “particular research 
methods” to terrorist offences. With the amendment of a single article of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure – 90ter –, a large number of criminal procedure locks are being broken, just like a 
chain reaction93. From now on, a wide range of measures may be authorised in the context of 
the search for terrorist offences, including private telecommunications surveillance measures, 
proactive investigations, temporary freezing of bank accounts, discreet visual checks, 
infiltration, observation in a home, full anonymous testimony, telephone tracing or even the 
protection of threatened witnesses, in short, a whole series of mechanisms which derogate 
from ordinary law and which, a priori, do not respect the principle of adversarial proceedings 
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and the rights of the defence. 
Thirdly, Belgium has extended the possibility of revoking Belgian nationality for dual nationals. 
Although anecdotal, this measure is certainly marked by an important symbolic weight, as we 
have seen during the debates on its adoption in the French Republic. Under Belgian law, the 
Nationality Code has been amended for this purpose. It should be noted that the main novelty 
in relation to the possibility of forfeiture of existing nationality is the abolition of any time limit. 
Thus, regardless of how long has elapsed since the commission of the terrorism offence, the 
judge will be able to order forfeiture. According to the legislator, this can be explained by the 
fact that terrorism “can be interpreted as a form of rejection of the country, its institutions and 
its values” 94 . The Constitutional Court has endorsed this reform 95 . Nevertheless, some 
questions remain96. 
The legislator is not the only one to have acted during this recent period. Indeed, the 
Constituent itself intervened to revise an article that had remained unchanged since the birth 
of the Kingdom in 1831, namely article 12. The latter enshrines the maximum time limit for 
police arrest – the “garde-à-vue” – of 24 hours before having to obtain a warrant from an 
investigating judge. On 24 October 2017, the Constitution was revised to increase this period 
to 48 hours97. The constitutional amendment is different from the interventions dealt with so 
far in that it affects all citizens for, a priori, all types of offences. However, “the reading of 
parliamentary documents gives rise to this feeling that the ‘Salduz’ case law was only a pretext 
for the Constituent Assembly which, to tell the truth, was more concerned about the fight 
against terrorism”98. 
B) The “administrativisation” of the fight against terrorism / power to the 
executive 
The terrorist threat is a global phenomenon and must be understood both a priori and a 
posteriori. “Our country has many more foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq than other 
countries. This worrying observation requires that we look for the causes”, stresses the inquiry 
committee99. It is from this premise that the federal authorities have started to adopt a series 
of measures that more or less infringe public freedoms in order to prevent the commission of 
terrorist attacks but above all in order to stem the radicalisation of young people. In this context, 
it is usually the Belgian government that is at work. Moreover, it is above all a question of 
giving more power of action to the authorities on the ground, most often local, whether they 
are administrative or police. 
First, a 2017 law amended the Communal Law in order to allow the mayor of a commune, the 
first administrative chief of his locality as well as the chief of the local police, to order the 
closure of establishments suspected of harbouring terrorist activities100. This new prerogative 
of the mayor, which offends a priori the constitutional freedoms of assembly and association, 
offers him an important power on his territory. 
Second, a law adopted the same month aims at relaxing the obligation of professional secrecy 
                                                      
94 Doc. parl., Ch., sess. 2014-2015, No. 54 1198/001, 8. 
95 Constitutional court, case No. 85/2009 of 14 May 2009. 
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which weighs on certain professionals101. From now on, agents of the Public Social Action 
Centres will be required to inform “immediately” the Public Prosecutor’s Office of any 
information that may constitute “serious evidence” of a terrorist offence. Although stemming 
from a legitimate desire to benefit from the best possible information in order to thwart possible 
attacks, the law does not completely reassure in that it places in the hands of these agents 
the responsibility to evaluate themselves the quality of the confidences received and their 
possible dangerousness102. 
In another vein, in March 2017, the Council of Ministers reached an agreement to extend the 
competences of private security organisations: installation of surveillance cameras, use of 
flying/mobile camera systems, carrying weapons, searching103 . One year later, a law was 
adopted to extend the possibility of using surveillance cameras, supplemented by a Royal 
Regulation104. The adoption of these new provisions is very clearly motivated by the desire to 
combat terrorism, although the new legislation applies indiscriminately. For example, the new 
law now allows intelligence services (State Security (VSSE) and the General Intelligence and 
Security Service (SGRS)) to consult live police surveillance footage, which they were 
previously unable to do. 
Still in the administrative field, it is now up to the Minister of the Interior or his delegates to 
refuse to issue an identity card or to decide to withdraw the same card from a person 
suspected of wanting to carry out terrorist activity abroad105. Two clarifications should be noted. 
On the one hand, as we have already seen, the new legislation closely associates the CUTA 
with this decision, since its opinion is necessary to pronounce the measure. On the other hand, 
it should be noted that the measure “may also apply to minors as well as adults”106. This also 
illustrates the administrativisation of the handling of the terrorist phenomenon can be 
illustrated in particular by the new power to refuse to issue identity documents or to withdraw 
them, although this legislative amendment is largely the result of the implementation of a 
United Nations Security Council resolution107. 
Among the many other Royal Regulations adopted with a view to strengthening the power of 
the executive and the administration, we should mention: the Royal Regulation of 2 June 2015 
establishing the Strategic Committee and the Intelligence and Security Coordination 
Committee108; the Royal Regulation of 1 May 2016 establishing a national emergency plan for 
the approach of a terrorist hostage or terrorist attack109; the Royal Regulation of 21 July 2016 
on the joint Foreign Terrorist Fighters database and implementing certain provisions of Section 
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1bis “Information Management” of Chapter IV of the Law of the Police Functions110; the Royal 
Regulation of 16 February 2017 laying down the procedure according to which the King may 
recognize an act of terrorism within the meaning of article 42bis of the law of 1 August 1985111. 
Criticisms from the judicial world were not long in coming112. This “shift from the judicial to the 
administrative”113, denounced by the Prosecutor General Christian de Valkeneer, is certainly 
one of the constants to be underlined since the beginning of the recent wave of attacks in 
Europe. For the author, the current model gives an increasing place to the administrative police 
and the concept of public security to the detriment of the criminal approach to the phenomenon. 
The Attorney General considers this movement dangerous as it provides important 
prerogatives to the administrative authorities114. 
Conclusion 
“I would rather wish, actually, that we have a state of emergency "à la française" than we touch 
the core of our criminal law because it would threaten the rule of law and the situation of all 
citizens”, said Christophe Marchand, a Belgian attorney 115 . By definition, the state of 
emergency entails a modification in the protection of fundamental rights and in the balance 
between the state powers, as it grants mainly the executive with wider powers to effectively 
overthrow a terrorist threat or a crisis situation. However, due to the lack of such mechanism, 
there is no specific measures in Belgium that could be activated only in the hypothesis of 
specific circumstances such as a clear and present risk for the State. Of course, that does not 
mean there is no action in that cases, but the constitutional control would be the same as other 
acts. 
Recent events have clearly required stronger measures to fight terrorists. From the different 
examples highlighted, we can see the incredible range of legislation and regulations available 
to the authorities, both administrative and judicial, to deal both with emergency situations 
relating to terrorism and with the more global phenomenon of radicalism. However, no 
exceptional regime has been used to exercise these existing prerogatives. How, then, can we 
explain that the advocates of the creation of an institutionalised state of emergency in Belgium 
still exist, as we have seen in the first part of our article? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to define the way in which the Belgian system functions in the field of terrorism and 
to compare it with the main salient features of a “classic” state of emergency. 
Belgium functions, as we have seen, by amending or creating ordinary legislation, although 
often limited to the terrorist field. It is important to ask what separates the Belgian way of 
dealing with the terrorist phenomenon, without a state of emergency, from the way used by 
countries in a state of emergency. Is it only, as Jan Velaers has pointed out116, the restriction 
of the scope of the measures to terrorist offences and the failure to transfer the means of 
action to the executive branch that separate the two systems? Let us examine these two 
aspects. 
On the one hand, the restriction of the scope of the newly created measures to terrorist 
offences would be an important difference with the state of emergency. While most of the 
measures adopted by the federal authority are aimed exclusively at terrorist offences, some 
are not. Thus, amending the Constitution to extend the period of police custody potentially 
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concerns any person and any offence. Beyond this remark, it is a chimera to think that the 
scope of terrorist offences constitutes a homogeneous and determined whole. Moreover, 
although normally circumscribed, the interpretation of these new criminal measures very often 
constitutes an open door to the arbitrariness of the judge (or the administration) since they 
have an eminently subjective scope, by wanting to incriminate intentionality. This explains why 
some see in this “legislative frenzy […] a subjectification of criminal law”117. 
On the other hand, the lack of transfer of the means of action to the executive power would 
be an important difference with the state of emergency. Here too, this statement needs to be 
challenged. Admittedly, broad powers have not been given temporarily to the Belgian 
government as it may have been the case in France or in other states under a state of 
emergency. Nevertheless, important decisions on action to prevent and suppress terrorism 
and potentially violate individual and collective human rights can be taken by governmental or 
executive actors. One example is certainly the preponderance of the federal prosecutor’s 
office in this matter, marked by its subordination to the executive power118 . One can also 
mention the role of the mayors or the CUTA, seen above. 
We would tend to think that the difference does not necessarily lie in these two criteria, but, 
more insidiously for the Belgian system, in its permanence, contrary to the state of emergency 
marked by its temporary character. Indeed, the presence of soldiers in the streets is not linked 
to an exceptional power that the executive should “return” at the end of a given time since its 
possibility is provided for in permanent legislation. Similarly, the list of Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters and the power to detain or refuse to issue identity papers are not linked to the 
existence of the Islamic state but will remain in force until they are repealed by a new 
parliamentary majority. 
At the end, we will object that a final difference may lie in the severity of the measures, that 
are supposed to be more flexible in the Belgian system since they must respect the 
Constitution, which has not been suspended by a possible state of emergency. According to 
Jan Velaers, the use of ordinary legislative amendments to deal with the terrorist phenomenon 
has at least one advantage, namely that it remains within the scope of respect for the 
fundamental rights enshrined both in the Belgian Constitution and in international 
conventions119. Thus, if one examines the various measures taken by the Belgian legislator 
after the attacks on the Jewish Museum in Brussels, they were subject to a priori control by 
the Council of State, as well as a posteriori by the Constitutional Court, in particular as to their 
compatibility with a series of fundamental rights including the freedom of expression, the 
prohibition of deprivation of liberty or the freedom of movement. Here again, the border is 
porous. Indeed, the Constitutional Court tends to be more lenient with repressive texts justified 
by the fight against terrorism120. On the basis of these reflections, some do not hesitate to 
assimilate the state of emergency and the repressive system specific to terrorism in Belgium. 
For example, J.-C. Paye considers that “this type of legislation, by generalising exception 
procedures at all stages of the criminal procedure, puts us in a permanent state of exception, 
in which what was the rule, the guarantee of certain constitutional rights, is constantly 
violated”121. 
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At this stage, we will lend an ear to some authors. “When a State is confronted with a serious 
threat, such as terrorism, it may be tempted to proceed with what Mireille Delmas-Marty calls 
a ‘circumvention of the rule of law’, by ‘a duplication of the criminal system between a common 
law that respects the principles and a parallel circuit that is gradually freed from them by a 
tightening of procedural and substantive rules,”122. The conclusions of part of the Belgian legal 
doctrine are unequivocal. They see in these reforms “a concern to intervene ever more 
upstream”, to “play on the register of symbols”, with, in the end, a risk of “being 
counterproductive”123. 
In conclusion, we must ask ourselves the question of the relevance of introducing a state of 
emergency in Belgium since the government already enjoys broad powers in this area, helped 
by the administrative movement to combat terrorism, the relative consensus within parliament 
in this area and the leniency of the Constitutional Court when it comes to defending 
fundamental rights in this particular field. In short, we will say with another author that while 
the fight against terrorism is undoubtedly the challenge of contemporary European societies, 
“the rule of law does not enshrine the principle that the end justifies the means”124. 
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